deals, may
be left. to F.o.)
[Tome pm. 4/5]
A
Munt will.
16/5/45.
I agree with Mr. MacDougall that, although we are not directly concerned with the proposals put forward in, we should welcome and support them on the general ground of the desirability of increasing British influence in China.
As I understand it, the proposals put forward in No.72 and summarized in No. 24 supersede the suggestion put forward by the United States General Olmsted (which may have been cleared with General Wedemeyer by now see last sentence of last enclosure to NoJ that a British Economic Liaison Officer should be appointed to
General Olmsted's Section at United States Army Headquarters. I imagine that this point will have to be cleared up with the Ambassador. If it is the case that the proposal for a liaison mission with Chinese General Headquarters would provide, inter alia, the economic liaison, which was the object of General Olmsted's proposal, this would be the obvious approach for clearing the matter both with General Wedemeyer and the Generalissimo.
As Mr. MacDougall says, paragraph 9 of No
No.7 provides the "useful approach" mooted by Mr. Gent on No. # Personally, I think that this is the most important part of the despatch so far as we are concerned. I suggest that we should make the fullest possible use of it to press the War Office to agree to the immediate militarization of the Hong Kong Planning Unit. There is an obvious danger that the War Office will use this proposal for a British Liaison Mission with Chinese General Headquarters to abandon or defer the militarization of the Hong Kong Planning Unit. In my view, the best way to avoid this danger, is, as indicated above, to use paragraph 9 of the despatch putting forward the general proposal to reinforce our case
(Nora)
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